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HOW MUCH DOES MONEY MATTER IN
A DIRECT DEMOCRACY?
JOHN M. DE FIGUEIREDO*
The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC held that the
broad outlines of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act passed both legal
and constitutional scrutiny.' The McConnell Court agreed with the
defenders of the Act that the potential corruptive influence of special
interest money in politics was a sufficient rationale for restricting the flow
of money in unlimited quantities into candidate campaigns and political
parties. 2 Now the focus of activists has turned to ballot initiative and
referendum campaigns. These groups have argued that the tight
relationship of candidates to particular ballot initiatives creates the same
corruptive influence that concerned the Court in candidate elections.3 Thus,
there is an increasingly loud call for restrictions on ballot campaign
financing.4
It would seem, however, that before we heed calls for legislatively or
judicially imposed restrictions on ballot measure financing, it would be
prudent to know the effect of such financing on ballot outcomes. Knowing
* Fellow in Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and John
M. Olin Senior Visiting Fellow in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank Beth
Garrett, Chang-Ho Ji, Jonathan Katz, Thad Kousser, John Matsusaka, Nolan McCarty, and participants
of the Symposium of the Impact of Direct Democracy, January 15, 2005, for helpful conversations and
comments.
1. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2. For a lengthy discussion of this point, see John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying
for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591 (2005).
3. See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 897-907 (2005).
4. See id. at 910-11 (discussing the efforts by scholars and activists to limit ballot measure
financing).
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the effect of money in ballot measure campaigns would not only provide
legal scholars with an important piece of information regarding whether
restrictions on money are warranted, but it would also aid in the
construction of those restrictions should they be needed. This short paper
provides an overview of the statistical literature examining the effect of
money on ballot measure outcomes and analyzes the validity of the
statistical analyses.
Social scientists have examined the question of ballot financing from a
statistical perspective for over a decade. The canonical regression which is
run is as follows:
Vote Share/ = P0 + Pl($Fori) + 02($Againsti) + yXi + Ej
where the dependent variable, Vote Share, is some measure of the ballot
measure i's outcome (such as the share of the winning vote), $For is the
amount of money spent in the campaign by proponents of the measure,
$Against is the amount of money spent in the campaign against the ballot
initiative, and X is a matrix of variables related to the ballot question, such
as the characteristics of the measure or the election, and Ei is the error term.
The parameters P1, P2, and 'y measure the effect of the independent
variables on the dependent variable 5 and are estimated by the regression
analysis.
Many scholars have run the above regression, and the result has
largely been the same across authors-namely that f1 (though often having
a negative coefficient) is not statistically different from zero, while P2 is
negative and statistically significant. 6 That is, money spent against
initiatives has an effect in reducing support for the ballot question, but
money spent for an initiative has no statistical effect in increasing vote
share (and may actually diminish support for the ballot question). Arthur
Lupia and John Matsusaka summarized the current wisdom on ballot
measure campaign finance as follows:
The general finding [in the literature] was that heavy spending against a
measure tended to lead to the measure's defeat, whereas heavy spending
5. 3o is the constant.
6. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 147-63 (1998); ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST
GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 101-20 (1999); Elizabeth Garrett &
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative and Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects and
Prospects for Reform, in THE BATrLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 85-87 (M. Dane Waters ed.,
2001); Chang-Ho C. Ii, California's Direct Democracy 1976-1998: Predictors, Outcome, and Issues
(1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Western Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, 1998, on file with author).
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in favor of a measure had minimal effect. That basic finding has held up
well in studies using more sophisticated techniques.7
This result raises serious questions. If these results are correct, why is
the effect of spending on outcomes asymmetric? Moreover, why would
anyone spend in support of the initiative if there is no, or even a negative,
effect? The problem in this result lies in the fact that the analysis to date is
likely incomplete. There are certainly factors omitted from the analysis that
appear in the error term, ei, that are correlated with the amount spent for
and against the ballot initiative. For example, money is more likely to be
spent when polling shows that the vote on a ballot measure is likely to be
close. If a ballot measure has widespread support, there is little need to
spend money; if a ballot measure is very unpopular, there is, again, little
need to spend money, as the measure will likely fail. The problem in this
specification of the regression is that the amount of money spent for and
against a given ballot question is an endogenous choice variable that must
be modeled, and not an exogenous variable as is assumed in the ordinary
least squares regression that many previous authors have used. If one does
not take into account this endogeneity, manifested by a correlation of the
error term and the spending variables, the regression analysis will generate
biased coefficients.
Thomas Stratmann, in his article The Effectiveness of Money in Ballot
Measure Campaigns, recognizes this precise methodological problem in
the literature. 8 He very nicely explains the endogeneity and omitted
variable bias problems that have plagued the empirical statistical literature
on ballot questions to date. In his article, Stratmann seeks to correct the
recurring statistical problems in the literature.
Rather than use a dataset on overall ballot question spending,
Stratmann uses a dataset on the number of television advertisements and
the amount spent on television advertising by the supporters and opponents
of eighteen ballot questions in California from 2000 to 2004. In addition,
Stratmann examines advertising on the county level, rather than on the state
level as previous papers have done. In doing this, Stratmann is not only
able to exploit cross-county variation in the data, but he is able to focus
only on attempts by advocates and detractors to persuade the electorate
through advertising on television. To control for the endogeneity and
7. Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 7
ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 463, 470 (2004) (citing Garrett & Gerber, supra note 6).
8. Thomas Stratmann, The Effectiveness of Money in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1041, 1055-55 (2005).
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omitted variable bias problem, the article uses county and ballot measure
fixed effects.
Stratmann's findings are striking. First, using this data and controlling
for the methodological problems as he does, he finds that both television
advertising spending in support and against a ballot question have a
statistically significant effect on the vote shares. That is, contrary to the
previous literature, the article demonstrates both that 13I is positive and
statistically significant and that 32 is negative and statistically significant.
He also measures the substantive effect of money. He finds that the results
imply that "100 extra advocacy television advertisements increase the
ballot's vote percentage [in a county] by 1.2 percentage points, and the
same number of opposition advertisements decreases this percentage by 0.6
percentage points." 9 In explaining his finding, he notes that advocacy
advertising is twice as effective as opposition advertising on a dollar-for-
dollar basis.
Note, however, that this substantive effect is somewhat small. The
article shows that on average, 428 advocacy advertisements and 190
opposition advertisements occur in a given county during a given ballot
initiative.10 Thus, 100 extra advertisements represents a 23% increase in
advocacy advertising and 53% increase in negative advertising. Cast in this
light, the effects that Stratmann finds in his article, though statistically
significant, are quite small: a 23% increase in advocacy advertisements
increases vote share by 1.2 percentage points, while a 53% increase in
opposition advertisements decreases vote share by only 0.6 percentage
points.
The fundamental question for the Stratmann analysis, however, is how
well the county's and ballot initiative's fixed effects control for the
endogeneity and omitted variable bias problems.
Yair Mundlak demonstrated theoretically that fixed effects can solve
the endogeneity and omitted variable bias problems when the nature of
endogeneity is specific to the actor and time-invariant." In the context of
Stratmann's article, this would mean that county fixed effects solve the
statistical problem if the willingness to support any given ballot measure by
a county is time invariant. While one may reasonably believe that
9. Id. at 20; Stratmann, supra note 8, at 1055.
10. Id. at 1055.
11. Yair Mundlak, Estimation of Production and Behavioral Functions from a Combination of
Cross-Section and Time-Series Data, in MEASUREMENT IN ECONOMICS: STUDIES IN MATHEMATICAL
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 138 (1963).
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preferences in a given county do not change appreciably over a four year
period,' 2 county fixed effects will not solve the endogeneity problem if
there is heterogeneity in underlying preferences for the status quo across
ballot measure type within a county.
This is perhaps best explained by an example. Assume a Republican-
dominated county and imagine two types of ballot measures: one to cut
taxes and one to substantially increase taxes. In the main results of
Stratmann's article, the county has an underlying willingness to keep the
status quo (or conversely, an underlying willingness to pass any given
ballot measure). The county fixed effects imply that this county has an
equal underlying willingness (because of preferences) to pass both of these
measures and that advertising will be targeted in such a way to maximize
the outcome. But clearly, in this example, the underlying willingness of this
Republican county to pass tax cuts will be much higher than the underlying
willingness of this county to pass substantial tax increases. That is, the
underlying willingness of county j to pass ballot measure i will differ
across ballot measures. County fixed effects will not solve the omitted
variable and endogeneity problems if measures are of different types.
Although preferences are time invariant within a county, the status quo bias
of a county (or underlying willingness to pass any given ballot initiative)
changes from ballot question to ballot question.
One natural reply to this critique is that the ballot fixed effects with
county fixed effects solve this problem. Ballot fixed effects, the argument
goes, will control for differences in ballot measures and allow us to solve
the omitted variable bias problem. This argument, while appealing, is likely
incomplete. Ballot fixed effects only allow one to control for differences in
spending across counties within a ballot issue.
We can return to our example. Suppose we have our ballot measure to
cut taxes. Democratic counties will be more likely to vote against the
measure; Republican counties will be more likely to vote for the measure.
If on the other hand, our ballot measure proposes to raise taxes, the
opposite will be true. Ballot fixed effects do not allow us to identify how
different counties react to different ballot measures, only how different
counties react to the same ballot measure.
12. Note that during the sample frame, the September II attacks occurred, there was a financial
crisis in California, the Governor was recalled, and a new Governor was elected. It is quite plausible
that even within a county in California, there were large changes in preferences during this time because
of these exogenous events.
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To summarize, the problem is that county fixed effects control for
differences in counties. Ballot fixed effects controls for differences in ballot
questions. What is really needed here is to control for dimension i (ballot
measures) andj (counties) simultaneously. One method of solving this is to
interact all the county fixed effects with all the ballot fixed effects (for all
combinations). This would allow one to control for the i andj dimensions
simultaneously. Of course, this is infeasible because there are not enough
degrees of freedom to estimate the parameters of such a model.
When faced with this problem, there are two practical ways to solve it.
The first is to characterize the ballot initiatives according to underlying
characteristics that are linked to the preferences for the status quo. For
example, one could characterize the ballot questions as "conservative" or
"liberal." Then, separate regressions can be run for the liberal and
conservative measures. The willingness of a given voter to keep the status
quo will be directly related to his or her preferences relative to the
ideological leaning of the ballot measure. One can then examine how
campaign spending will affect the willingness of a voting bloc, which is a
given ideological distance from a ballot measure, to change the status quo.
This is precisely what Stratmann does in extensions to his analysis
presented in Table 3.13 In a creative measure of the ideological makeup of a
ballot measure, Stratmann uses the voting recommendations of the Los
Angeles Times to determine whether an initiative is liberal or
conservative. 14 He then replicates his analysis and finds results similar to
his previous analysis, though every dollar of advocacy advertising is then
nearly three times as productive at determining the vote outcome as a dollar
of opposition advertising.
13. Stratmann, supra note 8, at 1057 tbl.3.
14. See Tim Groseclose & Jeff Milyo, A Measure of Media Bias (Dec. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/groseclose/
MediaBias.pdf. Tim Groseclose and Jeff Milyo have developed an ideology score for a number of
major media outlets, including the Los Angeles Times. They found that the Los Angeles Times is a
liberal-leaning newspaper. See id. at 39-40 tbls.3, 4. Stratmann examines his eighteen ballot measures
and determines whether the Los Angeles Times recommends supporting or opposing the measure. If the
Los Angeles Times supports the measure, it is considered liberal; if the Los Angeles Times opposes the
measure, it is considered conservative. One small caution must be sounded. The Groseclose and Milyo
scores refer to the ideological leaning of the news stories, not the editorial pages. Their study found, for
example, that the news stories in the Wall Street Journal are quite liberal, even though its editorial
pages are conservative. Thus, the added assumption in the Stratmann article is that the Groseclose and
Milyo scores for news represent the ideological leanings of the editors of the newspaper who make the
voting recommendations. This caveat, however, does not diminish the creativeness of the Stratmann
approach.
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While quite creative, and certainly a leap in the statistical analysis of
ballot measure spending, even this analysis can at times have shortfalls. In
particular, it bifurcates the analysis into liberal and conservative initiatives,
but some initiatives may not be "liberal" or "conservative." For example,
some "conservative" counties may be very willing to support gambling but
not term limits, while other "conservative" counties may be willing to
support term limits but not gambling. Thus, while the liberal and
conservative labels do indeed buy us some traction on the problem, it is not
a complete solution because it does not allow for strategic spending by
allowing both i andj to vary simultaneously.
This then leads to our second method to solve this problem:
instrumental variables in a two stage regression. Instrumental variables are
variables that are correlated with $For or $Against in this case, and
uncorrelated with the error term, F. In more concrete terms, we seek
variables that are directly correlated with $For and $Against, but are
uncorrelated with the outcome of the vote on the ballot question (except
through the spending variables). In the first stage, the researcher regresses
$For or $Against on a series of independent variables, including the
instrumental variable. This generates predicted values for the amount of
money spent. In a second stage regression, the researcher then regresses the
vote outcome on the predicted spending levels (from the first stage
equation) and a series of independent variables to generate unbiased
estimates of the effect of spending on vote outcome. One attractive feature
of good instrumental variables is that they vary in both i and j
simultaneously. Another way of saying this, in the context of the Stratmann
article, is that they would vary across county and ballot initiative
simultaneously, thus solving the omitted variable bias problem.
The challenge for scholars is to find good instruments. Good
instruments are very difficult to find because the instrument must be
directly correlated with spending but not directly correlated with ballot
outcomes. In a work in progress, however, by John de Figueiredo, Chang
Ho Ji, and Thad Kousser, instruments are being developed. 15 In this
project, the authors examine California ballot measures between 1976 and
1998 where there has been spending on both sides of the ballot question at
15. John M. de Figueiredo, Chang-Ho Ji & Thad Kousser, Why Do Initiative Backers Waste
Their Money? Revisiting the Research on Campaign Spending and Direct Democracy (Apr. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on Direct Democracy in the West: Historical
Roots and Political Realities, Stanford University, April 14-15, 2005, on file with author).
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the state level. 16 Recognizing the same endogeneity and omitted variable
bias problem as Stratmann, the authors have developed an instrumental
variables approach to the problem. One set of possible instruments is to
identify the scope and size of economic benefit and cost to industry of the
ballot measure. 17 For example, take California Proposition IA, which
allows the governor to negotiate directly with Indian tribes to expand their
gambling operations. With such authority, the governor will likely allow
Indian tribes to substantially expand their profitable gambling operations in
California. 18 The benefit to Indian tribes will be fairly large (estimated in
the billions of dollars) and very concentrated (a handful of Indian tribes
will see most of the benefit of the proposition). Although others may
benefit, the bulk of the benefit accrues to the Indian tribes. This suggests
Indian tribes and casinos will have a strong incentive to spend money in
support of the proposition because they are able to overcome a serious
collective action problem.
The willingness and ability of corporations and business entities to
overcome the collective action problem is likely to be correlated with the
amount of money spent either for or against a ballot initiative, but is
unlikely to be directly correlated with the vote outcome (except through the
spending mechanism) because corporations do not vote. Thus, this would
seem to be a good candidate for an instrumental variable. In their work, de
Figueiredo, Ji, and Kousser have used instrumental variables to examine
the effect of spending on ballot outcomes. The initial results are mixed on
the validity of these instruments. Despite this, the overall results of the
instrumental variables analysis are broadly consistent with the Stratmann
findings. Although the authors' work is still in progress, this project
illustrates that instrumental variables to control for ballot measure
campaign spending, while difficult to identify, are not entirely elusive.
Stratmann is one of the academic leaders in the study of campaign
finance. It would be difficult to write a paper on the subject without citing
his work. His recognition of the endogeneity and omitted variable bias
problem in the literature on ballot measures is a substantial contribution to
the literature. This problem has plagued all previous work in the field (that
I have examined). His approach of using fixed effects to address this
16. See id at 15-16. While the authors do develop instrumental variables at the state level, they
would not be valid at the county level as would be required in the Stratmann dataset. Nevertheless, they
do provide some guidance as to how one might think about new instruments.
17. See id. at 17-18.
18. The state will likely receive substantial tax revenue from any compact, but Indian tribes will
also likely see substantial surplus despite the taxes.
1072 [Vol. 78:1065
HeinOnline  -- 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1072 2004-2005
2005] MONEY IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1073
problem provides a partial solution. His extension of separating the liberal
and conservative measures provides a more complete solution. These
methodological innovations in the empirical analysis on ballot measure
financing are vast leaps in understanding how money affects ballot measure
outcomes. A fixed effects approach with instrumental variables, however,
will allow us to address this problem more comprehensively and would
seem to be a worthy goal for scholars of this literature.19 More generally,
papers that recognize the omitted variable bias and endogeneity problem in
the literature and attempt to correct it will raise the debate on campaign
finance on ballot measures to a much higher level and allow more serious
discourse on the subject to guide the Supreme Court's rulemaking. We can
only encourage this kind of work to determine how much money truly
matters in a direct democracy.
19. Stratmann is clearly a proponent of this agenda. See Stratmann, supra note 8, at 1052 n.43,
1061.
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